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The "Adversary" Process in Child
Custody Proceedings
T RECENT CONCERN with procedural due process in the area
of criminal law has raised interesting due process problems in
analogous fields, including child custody proceedings in domestic
relations cases. A conflict exists between the traditional notions of
the adversary process and out-of-court investigations implemented
through the ever-increasing contributions of the behavioral sciences.
The purpose of this Note is to determine the proper role of the so-
cial investigation in child custody cases. In analyzing this problem
it is necessary to examine, first, the due process requirements related
to this type of proceeding and, second, the extent, from both a quan-
titative and qualitative aspect, to which investigation reports are
used. From a quantitative standpoint it must be determined in
what instances such reports are required, and from a qualitative
standpoint it must be determined what legal limitations are imposed
upon their use. In regard to due process, the adversary versus the
nonadversary character of a custody proceeding must be consid-
ered, necessitating the analogy to other areas of the law.
L DuE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF CHILD CUSTODY
A. The Dilemma
Where there is litigation involving the custody of a child, the
judges are often compelled to make use of undisclosed reports of
investigating agencies1 as to the family situation. The reason ad-
vanced is either the need for expert advice or a distrust of tangible
evidence produced from such a proceeding or both.2 Despite the
great value of these reports, there has developed a conflict between
two competing social interests. One is that the fundamental prin-
ciples of American law demand that the decision of a court be based
on evidence produced in open court at a fair trial. The other, con-
versely, is that persons such as social workers who possess special-
ized training and experience are very much qualified to determine
what is in the best interests of the child.3
1 The term "investigating agency" is used broadly here to include welfare agencies,
court investigators, domestic relation investigators, court welfare workers, probation
officers, juvenile officers, officers of social service departments, departments of public
assistance, departments of domestic conciliation, police departments, departments of
public welfare, friends of court, psychiatrists, and psychologists.
2 See, e.g., Comment, 24 U. CI-L L REV. 349 (1957).
3 See Foster & Freed, Child Custody (pt. 2), 39 N.Y.U.. REv. 615 (1964); Note,
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More specifically, the former view stands for the proposition
that reports used outside the record contravene the American ideal
of due process of law The reasoning employed is that the reports
violate the rule against hearsay and, as a result, the parties are de-
nied the right to cross-examine witnesses, the right to hear the evi-
dence and observe the declarant's demeanor, and the right to ad-
duce testimony in rebuttal.5 In addition, the dedarant makes the
hearsay statement without having been administered an oath as
done in a court of law, leading, in turn, potentially to inaccurate
out-of-court statements.
Further, the exclusion of such evidence at trial prevents an ap-
pellate court from reviewing the case upon the same evidence con-
sidered by the trial court.6 Thus, in child custody proceedings, a
universal rule exists against the judicial use of social worker reports
that remain undisclosed and are not admitted into evidence.7 This
coincides with the general principle of law concerning factual ques-
tions not subject to judicial notice, namely, that a tribunal may not
consider material which is unknown to the parties! It should be
noted that a problem of hearsay also arises when the author of the
report appears in court to testify and his sources of information are
kept confidential.9
The Family in the Courts, 17 U. Prrr. L. REV. 206, 250-51 (1956). See also Annot.,
35 A.L.R.2d 629 (1954).
4 See, e.g., Walter v. Walter, 209 N.R.2d 691 (Ill. Ct App. 1965); Williams v.
Williams, 8 Ill. App. 2d 1, 130 N.E.2d 291 (1955); Watkins v. Watkins, 221 Ind. 293,
47 NXE.2d 606 (1943); Commonwealth ex rel. Mark v. Mark, 115 Pa. Super. 181, 175
Ad. 289 (1934). The Williams case cited here is the leading case in support of this
view, although there is no discussion of why the interest in custody is deemed to fall
within the due process requirements. See also U.S. CONST. amend V, XIV, § 1.
5 Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement
made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion to show the
truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the cred-
ibility of the out-of-court asserter.
The out-of-court assertion is offered as equivalent to testimony to the facts
so asserted by a witness on the stand. McCoRMIcK, EviDNqcE 5 225, at
460-61 (1954).
6 See Annot, 35 A.L.R.2d 629, 642 (1954).
7 E.g., Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P.2d 592 (1943); Williams v. Wil-
liams, 8 Ill. App. 2d 1, 130 N.E.2d 291 (1955); Holland v. Holland, 75 N..2d 489
(Ohio Ct. App. 1947). See Commonwealth ex rel. Mark v. Mark, 115 Pa. Super. 181,
175 AtL 289 (1934).
8 See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & N.J.R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
9 See Comment, supra note 2, at 357. However, it can be argued here that if the
investigators who have prepared the report are available in court for cross-examination,
the rule against hearsay need not be applied if one of two conditions exist:. (1) no error
occurs when the reports are admitted with the consent of the parties; and (2) no preju-
dicial error exists if the record contains other evidence supporting findings of the re-




In opposition is the liberal view, supported by the fact that in-
vestigation reports made by competent investigators ° do provide
more information on which the judge can base his opinion because
the actual living conditions of the family are revealed and the pos-
sibility of accusations which tend to hurt the adverse party are re-
duced. From a practical standpoint, the use of these reports mini-
mizes the time and cost of controversial court hearings and pro-
vides the judge with realistic suggestions for custody and visitation
arrangements even though questions of due process requirements
remain.'1
Nevertheless, no matter which view a court might adopt in a
custody proceeding, it should be emphasized that the main concern
of the court is what will be in the best interests of the child.1
Thus, courts are faced with a dilemma in child custody proceed-
ings since they must choose either (1) to comply strictly with the
requirements of due process, thus incurring the possibility of not
being well informed about the family circumstances, or (2) in
adopting the view that a child custody proceeding is not necessarily
an "adversary" proceeding, to make free use of the reports without
adhering to the technical rules of due process which are a natural
incident to all adversary proceedings, with the concomitant possi-
bility of denying a party his right to cross-examine and to refute
information adverse to his point of view.
B. Adversary vs. Nonadversary Proceedings
It is suggested that the nature of a child custody proceeding is
not really an "adversary proceeding" but is instead more akin to an
informal hearing whereby the infant is protected as a ward of the
court.'
3
10 Social workers, for example, are recognized as experts in family relations. See
Comment, supra note 2.
21 One should be cautioned here that too much dependency on such reports will
negate the real purpose and effect of the "adversary" process. For a discussion on the
advantages and disadvantages of the use of investigation reports by the judge, see Fos-
ter & Freed, supra note 3, at 615-22.
12 Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881). See also Foster & Freed, Child Custody
(pt. 1), 39 N.Y.UJ.. REv. 423 (1964).
18 See Williams v. Guynes, 97 S.W.2d 988 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) where the court
stated:
The proceedings are necessarily informal. It is the right and duty of the
trial court to ascertain any and all facts and to make such investigation of
conditions which in his judgment will assist him in reaching a proper solution
of the child's problems. Technical rules of practice are not to have control-
ling effect. The controlling issue on the merits is which custodian is for the
child's best interest. The pleading in such cases is considered of little impor-
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A leading case which deals with this problem and the due pro-
cess requirements of child custody is Williams v. Williams."' After
the court awarded custody of the child to the father, the intervenor
appealed, and the court held that it was reversible error for the
judge to use a confidential report which was not available for in-
spection by either party. 5 Not only were the report's sources of
information kept anonymous, but also the author's identity was not
revealed; as a result, the investigator was neither under oath nor
available for cross-examination, and thus the use of these outside
reports was held to contravene "the American ideal of due process
of law.' 6
In Williams the court drew an analogy to certain criminal trial
situations.'7 One resorted to was where the trial judge, after find-
ing the defendant guilty, made a private investigation of the scene
of the crime and of certain character witnesses. The Williams court
stated that such an investigation during the pendency of a motion
for a new trial was a denial of due process.'" Another situation
disapproved by the Williams case was the making of an outside in-
vestigation by a specifically appointed bailiff to ascertain the credi-
bility of certain alibi witnesses.'9
From these analogous situations the court suggested the conclu-
sion that all court investigations outside the realm of the courtroom
tend to deny the parties their rights to due process of law. Unfor-
tunately, this conclusion has been suggested without a distinction
being drawn between the nature of a criminal and child custody
proceeding. However, it is submitted that a major difference does
tance, and the judge exercising the jurisdiction of a chancellor has broad
equitable powers. Id. at 989.
See also Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CI. L. REv. 672, 676-85 (1942);
Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under Which a Child May Be Adopted With-
out the Consent of His Parents, 39 U. DET. LJ. 347 (1962); Comment, 36 So. CAL.
L. REV. 255, 257 (1963).
14 8 II. App. 2d 1, 130 N..2d 291 (1955).
15 Id. at 2, 7, 130 N.E.2d at 292, 294.
16 Id. at 7, 130 N.E.2d at 295. In many of these custody cases, the rule against the
use of "secret evidence" is said to be based upon due process provisions. The only ex-
planation for the inclusion of the problem of custody within these provisions comes
from analogous situations. See, e.g., Brooks v. De Witt, 178 S.W.2d 718, 723 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 143 Tex. 122, 182 S.W.2d 687 (1944) (cus-
tody interests as "property" rights); Harloe v. Harloe, 129 W. Va. 1, 5, 38 S.E.2d 362,
364 (1946) (due process protection of every litigant "in any matter affecting his or
her interest").
17 8 Ill. App. 2d at 6, 130 N.E.2d at 294.
18 Ibid., citing People v. Cooper, 398 Ill. 468, 75 N.E.2d 885 (1947).
19 8 Ill. App. 2d at 6, 130 N.E.2d at 294, citing People v. McGeoghegan, 325 Ill.
337, 156 N.E. 378 (1927).
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exist. While a criminal proceeding determines the guilt or inno-
cence of a particular defendant, a child custody proceeding is pri-
marily concerned with what is in the best interests of the child.20
Stated differently, the former is concerned with the truth or falsity
of certain facts to be determined by the jury, whereas the latter is
more concerned with the best possible remedy to be applied by a
judge to a certain set of given facts.
Therefore, in this respect it is suggested that a child custody pro-
ceeding is really nonadversary in nature and for this reason the tech-
nical rules of due process can be relaxed. This point was made
quite clear in a recent Illinois case:2
This special care exercised by the court on behalf of minors dis-
tinguishes custody cases from adversary proceedings. It is the child
that is the issue, not property. The state is present in the person
of the court to protect the child and to do what is best for his
welfare... Common sense tells us no less that the "notorious and
public hearing' prescribed for ordinary litigation is indeed "no-
torious" in the worst sense when applied to custody cases.22
In spite of the above reasoning, the prevalent view today seems to
be that the requirements of due process must be satisfied because
the parties cannot be deprived without their consent of any of the
usual protections guaranteed in a fair trial in open court.
23
C. Effect of Parties' Consent
If a party attacking the decision has consented to the use of the
independent investigation, the question then becomes whether or
not such consent also goes to the use of the report even though the
rules of due process are not completely satisfied.
2 0 The theory of such proceedings is discussed in text accompanying note 12 supra.
21 Oakes v. Oakes, 45 Il. App. 2d 387, 195 N.E2d 840 (1964).
22 Id. at 394, 195 N..2d at 844. (Emphasis added.)
2 3 See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 216 Ark. 453, 226 S.W.2d 579 (1950); Fewel v.
Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P.2d 592 (1943); Washburn v. Washburn, 49 Cal. App.
2d 581, 122 P.2d 96 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942); Mazur v. Lazarus, 196 A.2d 477 (D.C. C.
App. 1964); McGuire v. McGuire, 140 So. 2d 354 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962); Sheppard v.
Sheppard, 208 Ga. 422, 67 S.E.2d 131 (1951); Walter v. Walter, 209 N.E.2d 691 (IlM.
Ct App. 1965); In re Rosmis, 26 Ill. App. 2d 226, 167 N.E.2d 826 (1960); Williams
v. Williams, 8 Ill. App. 2d 1, 130 N.E.2d 291 (1955); Tumbleson v. Tumbleson, 117
Ind. App. 455, 73 N.E.2d 59 (1947); Wells v. Wells, 406 S.W.2d 157 (Ky. 1966);
Wacker v. Wacker, 279 Ky. 19, 129 S.W.2d 1043 (1939); Lyckburg v. Lyckburg, 140
So. 2d 487 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Alden v. Alden, 226 Md. 622, 174 A.2d 793 (1961);
Sweet v. Sweet, 329 Mich. 251, 45 N.W.2d 58 (1950); Dier v. Dier, 141 Neb. 685, 4
N.W.2d 731 (1942); Martinez v. Martinez, 49 N.M. 405, 165 P.2d 125 (1946); Hol-
land v. Holland, 75 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio Ct App. 1947); Commonwealth ex tel. Balick v.
Balick, 172 Pa. Super. 196, 92 A.2d 703 (1952); Mark v. Mark, 115 Pa. Super. 181,
175 At!. 289 (1934).
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Some courts are of the opinion that when there is a stipulation
or acquiescence in the use of such reports by the parties, the decision
of the trial court will not be upset.' In Rea v. ReaF5 the Supreme
Court of Oregon held that the consent of the parties to the inde-
pendent investigation constituted a waiver of any objection. The
reasoning of the court was that the parties by giving their consent
must have known that upon appeal the issue of custody could not
be tried de novo, since the record would be incomplete." Other
cases have held that if the parties do not timely demand that the
investigator appear and testify subject to the rules of evidence and
the right of cross-examination, they are deemed to have impliedly
consented to the procedure.2" However, no matter what reasoning
a court might use, the parties have in effect agreed that the decision
of the trial judge should be final.
Other courts, however, still require strict compliance with the
requirement of due process despite the consent or acquiescence of
the parties to an independent investigation." The reasoning used
here is that although the parties authorized the court to make the
investigation, there was nothing in the stipulation which actually
authorized the court to base its decision on a secret report or even
consider the recommendations in arriving at its decision."
Regardless of whether or not there has been consent by the
parties, some courts demand strict compliance with the hearsay rule;
the admissibility of an independent investigator's report in a custody
24 See, e.g., Biles v. Biles, 107 Cal. App. 2d 200, 236 P.2d 621 (Dist Ct. App. 1951)
(parties' consent to use of probation officer's report); Zachary v. Zachary, 155 Ore. 346,
63 P.2d 1080 (1937) (husband's consent to use of report before trial); Luman v. Lu-
man, 231 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (investigation used only to very limited
extent); Williams v. Guynes, 97 S.W.2d 988 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (informal pro-
ceeding which gives judge discretion to exercise broad equitable powers).
25 195 Ore. 252, 245 P.2d 884 (1952).
26 Id. at 279-80, 245 P.2d at 896.
27 Ibid. Express consent is usually required if such reports are never put in the
record. See, e.g., Moon v. Moon, 62 Cal. App. 2d 185, 144 P.2d 596 (Dist. Ct. App.
1944); Holland v. Holland, 75 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947); Balick v. Balick,
172 Pa. Super. 196, 92 A.2d 703 (1952).
28 See, e.g., Noon v. Noon, 84 Cal. App. 2d 374, 191 P.2d 35 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
This case is distinguished from Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P.2d 592 (1943)
on the mere fact that in the Fewel case a timely demand was made for the investigator
to appear and testify.
29 See, e.g., Watkins v. Watkins, 221 Ind. 293, 47 N.E.2d 606 (1943).
30 See, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 180 Ore. 275, 284, 176 P.2d 648, 652 (1947).
However, a careful reading of the facts in the Nelson case indicates that the real reason
for the holding was that there was an actual delegation of authority from the court to
the investigator who, as a result, not only advised the court but actually decided he
issue of custody. If this actually occurred, perhaps the decision of the court would have
been different had the investigator acted only in an advisory capacity.
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case will then depend primarily upon compliance with the ordinary
rules of evidence.81 The courts point out that the information de-
rived from outside investigations and interviews does not become
competent evidence merely because it is given by employees of the
court, for it may only be hearsay based upon hearsay.8"
From this discussion it should be quite apparent that the courts
differ greatly in their interpretation of the parties' previous consent
to an investigation. The only generalization that can be made with
some degree of accuracy is that the more the trial court complies
with the requirements of due process, the stronger is the case for
upholding the trial court's decision.
II. EXTENT TO WHICH SOCIAL INVESTIGATIONS
ARE USED
The use of social investigations and nonjudicial considerations
in the disposition of child custody matters has been considered by
the legislatures of virtually every state. An analysis of these legis-
lative pronouncements must be divided into three areas: (1) adop-
tion proceedings, (2) divorce proceedings, and (3) proceedings
involving delinquent and neglected children. This analysis will in-
volve not only the situations in which social investigations are em-
ployed but also the scope of such investigations and the restrictions
imposed upon their use.
A. Situations Calling for Social Investigations
(1) Adoption Proceedings.-A social investigation is used to
some extent in the adoption proceedings of practically every state.88
Only Alaska8 4 and Oregon 8 make no provision for investigations,
31 See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 216 Ark. 453, 226 S.W.2d 579 (1950); Noon v.
Noon, 84 Cal. App. 2d 374, 191 P.2d 35 (Dist. C. App. 1948); Washburn v. Wash-
burn, 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 122 P.2d 96 (Dist. Ct App. 1942); Ludy v. Ludy, 84 Ohio
App. 195, 82 N.R2d 775, rehearing denied, 84 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948);
Commonwealth ex rel. Mark v. Mark, 115 Pa. Super. 181, 175 Ad. 289 (1934).
32 See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Mark v. Mark, supra note 31. Ludy v. Ludy, 84
Ohio App. 195, 201, 82 N.E.2d 775, 777, rehearing denied, 84 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1948) follows the same type of reasoning in that the trial court was held to have
committed prejudidal error in permitting the court investigator to testify as a witness
to a conversation she had with the child on the ground that her testimony was hearsay
evidence.
33 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 226.6 (Supp. 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-6
(Smith-Hurd 1959); IOwA CODE § 600.2 (1962); OrnO REV. CODE § 3107.05; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-30-14 (Supp. 1965).
34 ALAsKA R. CIV. P. 5 3(d) provides for a master to hear evidence in an adoption
proceeding. Parties are notified of the filing of the report and may object to the mas-
ter's findings.
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although there are procedures for gathering information from out-
of-court sources. Of the remaining states which use social investi-
gations, ten make their use discretionary or provide for waiver of
the investigation. 6 The widespread use of investigatory reports in
the adoption area as compared with divorce proceedings would sug-
gest that the requirements of an adversary proceeding are not as
rigid in the former.
(2) Divorce Proceedings.-Only one state requires an investi-
gation to aid in determining the proper party to be awarded custody
of the child in a divorce proceeding.37 Other legislatures have given
their courts a discretionary power to call for an investigation, while
the remaining states make no provision for any kind of investiga-
tion in awarding custody pursuant to a divorce decree. Generally,
these statutes authorize the courts to award custody based on the
best interests of the child involved; however, there is no provision
for investigation to determine the child's best interests."
(3) Juvenile Proceedings.-In contrast to adoption and di-
vorce actions where the states have taken dear positions on the
need for investigations, the legislatures have treated the social in-
vestigation in juvenile proceedings in various ways. Almost one
half of the states make some definite provision for an out-of-court
investigation, usually by the state welfare department, in the dispo-
sition of juvenile cases.49 A few states make the use of investiga-
tions discretionary,4' while others require no more than a simple
85 OE. REV. STAT. § 109.3 10(4) (1959) provides that the State Public Welfare
Commission may submit information to the court if it so desires.
36AiR. STAT. ANN. § 56-105 (Supp. 1965) (discretionary); HAWAII REV. LAWS
331-8 (1955) (waiver); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 533 (1964) (waiver); MISs
CODE ANN. 5 1269-05 (1955) (discretionary); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-107 (1943);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-11-09 (waiver); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2587.10 (Supp. 1966)
(investigation mandatory upon filing of petition unless there is a showing of good
cause); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 437 (1959) (waiver); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-711
(Supp. 1965) (discretionary); MD. P- CIV. P. D 75, § b (discretionary).
87 CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 263.
38 FLA. STAT. § 65.21 (Supp. 1966); M,& REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, 5 751 (Supp.
1965); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-307 (1945); OHIo REV. CODE § 3109.04; ORE. REV.
STAT. § 107.430 (1961). Martinez v. Martinez, 49 N.M. 405, 409, 165 P.2d 125,
128 (1946) holds that if the judge is not satisfied with the evidence before him, he
may cause an independent investigation to be made. However, witnesses participating
in the independent investigation must testify in a hearing before the court.
3 9 Larkin v. Larkin, 85 Idaho 610, 382 P.2d 784 (1963); Schroeder v. Schroeder,
184 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 1966); Vines v. Vines, 344 Mich. 222, 73 N.W.2d 913 (1955);
Miracle v. Miracle, 388 P.2d 9 (Okla. 1964).
4 0 E.g., CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 582; D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2302
(1966); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9: 6-10 (1937); VA. CODE ANN. 5 16.1-164 (1955).
41DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, § 1172 (1953); KAN. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 817
(1963); MINN. STAT. § 260.151 (Supp. 1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-12.
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preliminary investigation to determine whether or not the court
should proceed.42 A peculiar approach to juvenile investigations,
and one perhaps based on considerations of due process and adver-
sary proceedings, may be found in the statutes of Hawaii43 and Mis-
souri44 which provide for out-of-court investigations only when
the proceeding would involve a termination of parental rights.
At least twelve states make absolutely no provision for an in-
vestigation in juvenile proceedings.45 A variation on the use of a
public welfare agency to conduct these out-of-court inquiries is for
a court to order that the child in question be examined by a doctor,
a psychiatrist, and a psychologist.!'
B. Use of the Social Investigation in Court Proceedings
(1) The Scope of a Social Investigation.-Before examining
the adversary considerations of these reports, namely, the right to
confront and to cross-examine and the opportunity to rebut, it is
only logical that inquiry be made regarding the type of information
contained in the reports. Generally, the adoption investigation is
designed to determine, first, if the child is suitable for adoption, and,
second, whether the adoptive parents will provide a suitable home.
An example of the information generally sought in an adoption in-
vestigation is found in an Arizona statute:
The investigator shall make inquiry among other things, with
respect to: 1. Why the natural parents, if living, desire to be re-
lieved of the care, support and guardianship of the child. 2.
Whether the natural parents have abandoned the child or are mor-
ally unfit to have custody of the child. 3. Whether the proposed
foster parents are financially able and morally fit to have the care,
supervision, and training of the child. 4. Whether the proposed
change of name and guardianship is for the best interest of the
child. 5. The physical and mental condition of the child.47
While the adoption proceeding is concerned with acquiring
4 2 Eg., MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 10-605 (1943); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-205.03
(Supp. 1965); It is interesting to note that Pennsylvania dearly prohibits any prelimi-
nary inquiry. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 246 (1939).
43 HAWAII REV. LAWS § 333-17 (1955) (investigation at the request of the peti-
tioners).
44 Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.491 (1959).
45 These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Louisiana, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
46 See AM. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 63 (1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-69 (Supp.
1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1191 (1962).
47 Apuz REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (1956). See also ARK STAT. ANN. § 56-105
(1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 912 (Supp. 1964); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 210, 5
5A (1932); MINN. STAT. § 259.27 (1961).
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rights of custody in the child to be adopted, a divorce proceeding
looks to the retention of a right to custody by contesting parents.
Thus, there is no concern over the qualifications of the child for
custody, and the inquiry focuses upon which parent will best serve
the welfare of the child.4" An Ohio statute provides a specific ex-
ample of the information to be considered in seeking the best inter-
ests of the child: "Prior to trial, the court may cause an investigation
to be made as to the character, family relations, past conduct, earn-
ing ability, and financial worth of the parties to the action.""
The distinct characteristic of juvenile proceedings leads to still
a third type of investigation. Generally, this type of inquiry dwells
heavily on the background of the youth with particular emphasis
on his family and environment.5 ° Although the juvenile proceed-
ing does not necessarily involve custody, in order for the court to
adequately rehabilitate the child, it may become necessary to termi-
nate parental rights.
A publication by the National Council on Crime and Delin-
quency sums up the problem as follows: "The juvenile court had
its very origin in appreciation of the importance of the social back-
ground, and it should evolve a use of probation reports which in-
sures fairness and reliability and at the same time encourages the
application of the behavioral sciences in the court."'" Because of
this concern with social background, it would appear that the states
should require some type of reform of the present systems to imple-
ment social investigations.
(2) State Attempts To Conform to an Adversary Proceeding.
-The most important aspect of this analysis of custody investiga-
tions is the manner in which the legislatures have attempted to
avoid any due process objections connected with the use of these
reports in adversary court proceedings. It is at this point that the
judicial procedures protecting against the use of secret evidence
come into direct conflict with the court's need to protect the source
48 For example, California requires the investigator to report al information perti-
nent to the welfare of the minor child. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 263.
4 9 OHIO REV. CODE § 3109.04 (Supp. 1966). See also ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.
430 (1961).
5 0 CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 582; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-66
(1949); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3208 (Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT. § 260.151 (Supp.
1966); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:9 (1937); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.040 (1959).
Kentucky provides that the judge shall cause an investigation to be made into the child's
age, habits, school record, general reputation, home conditions, and the life and char-
acter of the one having custody of the child. KY. REV. STAT. § 208.140 (1956).
51NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, PROCEDURE AND Evi-
DENCE IN THE JUVENILE COURT 59-60 (1962).
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of its information. 2 The statutes indicate that, while legislatures
superficially adhere to due process standards, valiant attempts have
nevertheless been made at solving the dilemma in which the court
finds itself. The result is a variety of solutions with no apparent
common base.
There are five distinct types of statutes which attempt to solve
the conflict between the adversary system and the social investiga-
tion. The classifications are to: (1) allow the parties to inspect the
report; (2) require the report be confidential and available only to
the judge; (3) permit use of the reports according to a strict appli-
cation of the rules of evidence; (4) require that the author of the
report be made available for cross-examination; and (5) permit the
parties to rebut any adverse findings in the report.
(a) Inspection by the Parties.-An easy though ineffec-
tive solution to the dilemma is to require a written report available
to the parties. With no significant advantage over present methods,
this plan sacrifices a portion of the vital adversary proceedings since
there is still no provision for confrontation of the investigator, while
the social worker's desire to protect his informant may be lost.
Nevertheless, this approach is taken by a large number of states,"
including Ohio in which the party must request access to the re-
port.54 Another group of states utilizes a method which may be
applicable to, although probably not designed for, this situation.
These statutes require that juvenile court records, including the in-
vestigation report, be dosed to public inspection except by order of
the court on a showing of good cause.55 If good cause is estab-
lished, a party might be able to gain access to the social investiga-
tion through this method.
(b) Confidential Reports.-At the opposite end of the
spectrum is a group of states which emphasizes the necessity of pro-
tecting the source of the investigator's information. Generally,
52 Id. at 60. It might be noted that these considerations could apply to adoption
and divorce proceedings as well as in juvenile court, although perhaps to a lesser de-
gree.
53 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-237 (1956) (juvenile proceedings only);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 226.7 (adoption proceedings); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 45-66
(1953) (adoption proceedings); FLA. STAT. § 39.12 (1961) (juvenile proceedings);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461:2 (Supp. 1965); (by implication, a party may examine
the report); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:3-23 (1953) (a copy is to be mailed to plaintiff).
5 4 0mo REV. CODE § 3109.04 Supp. 1966. Tennessee also permits disclosure but
only in the discretion of the chancellor. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-118 (1959).
5 5 MIcH. CoMP. LAws § 27.3178 (551) (1948) (adoption proceedings); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 48-16 (1949) (adoption proceedings); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.567 (1961)
(juvenile proceedings).
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these statutes provide that the investigator make his confidential re-
port directly to the judge.56 New Mexico has devised an approach
to adoption investigations which may provide an acceptable solu-
tion to this conflict. The investigator files a duplicate copy of his
report, while the clerk places one copy in a sealed envelope and sub-
mits the other copy directly to the judge. In the event of an appeal
from the finding, the copy in the sealed envelope may be used by
the appellate court 7 Although the party is still deprived of any
confrontation of witnesses and access to the reports at the trial level,
some attempt has been made toward an adequate review.
(c) Introduction of the Reports in Evidence.-In addition
to granting or denying rights of inspection by the parties, some
states have attempted to spell out exactly how this report may be
used in compliance with traditional due process concepts. For ex-
ample, an Illinois statute provides: "In no event shall any facts set
forth in the report be considered at the hearing of the proceeding,
unless established by competent evidence."58  Oregon and Nebraska
require the investigation to be introduced into the record according
to the rules of evidence.5" In contrast to these states stressing the
strict prohibition of secret evidence is a Florida statute which re-
quires the report to be filed in evidence. " However, the Florida
statute does make it clear that "the technical rules of evidence shall
not exclude such report."' Again, the variation among the states
appears to be based on a different analysis of the relative value of
the social investigation.
(d) An Opportunity To Cross-Examine.-Another indica-
tion that state legislatures are aware of the due process problem is
illustrated by various measures designed to insure the litigants an
opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Generally, the stat-
5 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2432 (1957); MINN. STAT. § 259.27 (1961); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-113 (1957). A number of the statutes make provision for access to these
records by the state welfare department The statutes discussed in note 55 supra may
properly fall under the category forbidding inspections with certain exceptions. For
example, the Virginia statute provides that the report "shall not be disclosed to anyone
other than the judge unless and until otherwise ordered by the judge or by the judge
of a court of record." VA. CODE ANN. S 16.1-209 (1955).
5 7 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-7 (1951).
58 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-6 (Smith-Hurd 1959).
59 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-307 (1945); ORE. REv. STAT. § 107.430 (1961). While
the Oregon statute specifically requires that the report be accepted subject to the rules
of evidence, the Nebraska statute states that the report will be competent evidence.
60 McGuire v. McGuire, 140 So. 2d 354 (Fla. App. 1962), construing FLA. STAT.
§ 65.21 (Supp. 1966).
61 FLA. STAT. § 65.21 (Supp. 1966).
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utes require that the author of the report be available for examina-
tion at trial. 2 North Dakota, while not requiring examination of
the author, requires that any element of the report which is relied
on by the court must have been taken under oath.' If the investi-
gator did not comply, then the witness must appear in court and
testify a second time.
The permissive nature of these confrontation and examination
provisions indicates that the states are not taking aggressive steps
toward a strict application of due process concepts. In light of the
nonadversary nature of custody proceedings, it is doubtful that these
weak attempts to engender adversary characteristics serve any use-
ful purpose.
(e) The Opportunity To Rebut.-One other type of stat-
ute is employed in several states to deal with social investigations.
If the investigator makes a finding which is adverse to one of the
interested parties, the party affected is given both notice of this as-
pect of the report and the opportunity to present evidence to rebut
the adverse findings.' Thus, although there is no cross-examina-
tion, the petitioner at least is aware of the problems facing him.
Contrast this situation with the Michigan 5 rule that the judge may
make an order based on his examination of the report, or the Idaho"
rule that an adverse finding by the investigator may result in a mo-
tion to dismiss initiated by the court itself.
(3) Interviews in Chambers.--A problem similar to that pre-
6 2 E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 263 (divorce); M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 751
(Supp. 1965) (limited to divorce proceedings, and interested party must request that
author testify). South Carolina goes somewhat further -with the following require-
ment:
Provided, that [the] signer of such report and all persons participating in,
conducting, or associated with the compiling, separation and filing of such
report shall be available for examination and cross-examination by any party
to an adoption proceeding concerning the contents and recommendations con-
tained in such report, in complete detail. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2587.10
(Supp. 1966).
As recently as 1965, Utah added a provision requiring the author of an investigation
in a juvenile proceeding to appear as a witness when he is reasonably available. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 55-10-96 (Supp. 1965).
63 N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-18. Apparently, the legislators favored the values of
the social scientist although the truthfulness of the testimony was the only judicial con-
cern.
64 HAWAII REV. LAWS § 331-8 (1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-6 (Smith-
Hurd 1959) (adoption proceedings); NEV. REv. STAT. § 127.130 (1965) (adoption);
ALAsKA P. CIv. P. 53(d) (master's report). Nebraska provides that the report be
available to the parties in any event but specifically affords parties an opportunity to
rebut its findings. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-307 (1945).
65 MICIL COMP. LAws § 2731.78 (546) (1948) (adoption).
66 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1506 (1951) (adoption proceedings).
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sented by out-of-court investigations is that of the private interview
of the child by the judge. Similarly, the judge is utilizing an out-of-
court device to discover what is in the child's best interests. There
are several recent cases dealing with this very problem, many of
which find such out-of-court interviews to be nonprejudicial. An
Illinois appellate court approved of this practice because it was mo-
tivated by a desire to lessen the ordeal to the child rather than to
obtain secret evidence. 7 The courts of Minnesota and Washington
permit such interviews only with the consent of the parties.68 By
way of contrast, the New Jersey courts continue to hold that such
out-of-court interviews by the judge are beyond his discretion.69
(4) Related Findings by the Courts and Legislators.-In a
case which interprets the provision enacted by Congress implement-
ing social investigations in juvenile proceedings in the District of
Columbia, a federal court of appeals examined the intent of Con-
gress: "Congress clearly intended, in this section, to encourage the
disposition of cases on a social rather than legal basis."' A few
states recognize the importance of such investigations vis-4-vis hold-
ings that any due process requirements are met by implication.71
This rather perfunctory application of due process labels appears
consistent with the legislative steps previously outlined. It seems
inevitable that a continued emphasis on procedural due process and
the increasing competence of the behavioral sciences will require
many legislatures to revise their inadequate provisions on social
investigations.
III. THE SOCIAL WORKER'S VIEW
The dilemma experienced by the social worker in a courtroom
arises out of the distinction between traditional legal evidence and
67 Stickler v. Stickler, 57 II. App. 2d 286, 291, 206 NME.2d 720, 723 (1965). It
might be noted that the objection to this procedure is not based solely on the secret
evidence argument.
68 Currier v. Currier, 271 Minn. 369, 376, 136 N.W.2d 55, 60 (1965); Christo-
pher v. Christopher, 62 Wash. 2d 82, 88, 381 P.2d 115, 118 (1963). The argument
set out in these cases is that by consenting to the interview the parties have waived any
due process objections.
69E.g., Kridel v. Kridel, 85 N.J. Super. 478, 484, 205 A.2d 216, 320 (Super.
Ct. 1964).
70 Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1956). De-
spite the apparent emphasis on the social nature of the proceeding, the court held that
informing the juvenile of his right to counsel was not inconsistent with this purpose.
71 Dahl v. Dahl, 237 Cal. App. 2d 407, 46 Cal. Rptr. 881, (Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
Brunt v. Watkins, 233 Miss. 307, 101 So. 2d 852 (1958) (no denial of due process
where rights of child's natural parents are not involved).
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the more modern social evidence7 The social worker is trained to
make determinations based on intangible factors such as "parental
attitudes or value standards" discovered by interview, whereas deter-
minations by a court are based on overt facts.7" Another reason for
the mutual distrust between the two professions results from the
lack of respect shown by the judicial process for the confidential
relation between social worker and subject.74
It is with these competing considerations in mind that the so-
cial worker criticizes the judicial procedures used in custody cases.
A relatively recent study of child placement agencies by the Child
Welfare League of America revealed the following objections to
adoption procedures: (1) such hearings should be conducted pri-
vately in chambers; (2) the proceedings should take on a more dig-
nified and less routine atmosphere; (3) more adequate safeguards
should be developed with. respect to confidential information; (4)
parental rights should be given greater consideration; (5) the adopt-
ing parents should be required to attend the proceeding; and (6) a
licensed representative of a child placement agency should be re-
quired to attend.7
It is the goal of the social worker to place the child in a home
which will best serve his needs. Apparently, the legislatures of
many of the states agree and have provided by statute for social
investigations, especially in the case of adoptions.76 The social
worker, however, is of the opinion that sufficient consideration is
not given to these reports by the courts.7 This disillusionment
with the judicial system may result from the exclusion of large por-
tions of investigatory reports either under the rules of evidence or
through a consideration by the courts of evidence apart from the
investigation.
In the area of juvenile proceedings, one author suggests that
any investigation by an officer of the court prior to the filing of the
petition actually tends to hinder the adversary process.7 If the
court commences a fact-finding study through its own employees,




7 5 SHAPIRO, A STUDY OF ADOPTION PRAcTICE 97-98 (1956).
7 6 For a partial list, see text accompanying notes 33-46 supra.
77 E.g., SHAPIRO, op. cit. supra note 75, at 95-96.
78 DE FRANCIS, THE COURT AND THE PROTECIVE SERVICES: THEIR RESPECTIVE
ROLES 14 (1960).
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it will subsequently be virtually impossible for the court to make
an impartial determination at the hearing. Although several states
provide for preliminary investigations, from the point of view of
an impartial fact-finder, the best solution is perhaps the one adopted
in Pennsylvania which specifically forbids this practice."o
A contribution by E. Donald Shapiro to a Conference on The
Extension of Legal Services to the Poor in 1964, in considering the
problem of the need for the social investigator in the sphere of the
adversary proceeding, pointed out that a basic premise of adversary
proceedings is that "from strife emerges truth."'  The behavioral
sciences, on the other hand, are not oriented to the concept of a
"winner and loser" in every circumstance. While the lawyer is ever
alert to the needs of his client, a social scientist may look to a
broader social good at the expense of individual rights."s
Shapiro is of the opinion that many of today's social problems
are not adaptable to strict adversary proceeding solutions," apply-
ing this theory to domestic relations as follows:
How does the adversary system work in a divorce action?
Well, frankly, it does not work. Who is there to protect the chil-
dren? Who is there to protect the interests of society? Since there
is really no adversary footing on the part of the parties, the safe-
guards built into the adversary system are nonexistent.88
As an alternative to the inadequate adversary process, Shapiro sug-
gests a greater reliance on the social worker, provided that the lat-
ter can gain a better understanding of the traditional notions and
policies of the adversary system. 4
As the behavioral sciences become more reliable, the legal pro-
fession will be compelled to come to grips with the basic objections
to judicial procedure voiced by the social sciences. Perhaps many
of these conflicts between legal and social evidence and the confi-
dential nature of sociological reports can be resolved by an increased
understanding of the goals and procedures of the two professions.
The formation of the National Council of Lawyers and Social
Workers may be a step in this direction. In any event it is clear
7 9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 246 (1939).
80 Shapiro, Specific Technique for Providing Social Workers With Legal Perspec-
tive, in CONFERENCE ON THE EXTENSION OF LEGAL SERVIcEs TO THE POOR 148-
49 (1964).
81 Id. at 149.





that with an increased knowledge of intangible and tangential
causes of human behavior, legal procedures based solely on estab-
lishment of overt facts will not serve the purposes of society.
IV. ANALOGOUs NONADVERSARY SITUATIONS
A. Due Process Guaranty in Criminal
Pre-Sentencing Hearing
It is suggested that the nonadversary nature of a pre-sentencing
hearing in regard to due process requirements is analogous to the
circumstances existing in a child custody proceeding where the judge
utilizes outside investigation reports. Those writers who advocate
the individualized treatment of criminal offenders are of the opinion
that each sentence should be based upon the fullest possible knowl-
edge about the prisoner's character, background, and antecedent
criminal career.85
In the case of Williams v. New York,"6 the United States Su-
preme Court was faced with the issue of whether the rules of evi-
dence should apply when a judge obtains and uses outside informa-
tion to guide him in the imposition of sentence upon the convicted
defendant After the jury found the appellant guilty of murder
and recommended a life sentence, .the judge, instead, imposed the
death sentence." In sustaining the death sentence, the Supreme
Court held that the judge is empowered to consider information ob-
tained outside the courtroom from persons whom the defendant has
not been permitted to confront or cross-examine"8 and that such a
procedure is not a violation of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment."9
85 See, e.g., Note, 49 COLUM L REV. 567 (1949).
86 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
87 Id. at 242-43.
88 Consideration of this additional information was pursuant to a state statute which
provides:
Before rendering judgment or pronouncing sentence the court shall cause
the [defendant's] previous criminal record to be submitted to it, including
any reports that may have been made as a result of a mental, psychiatric or
physical examination of such person, and may seek any information that will
aid the court in determining the proper treatment of such defendant. Id. at
243, citing N.Y. CODE CaIM. PROC. § 482 (Supp. 1966).
89 The court made its point when it said:'
The type and extent of this information make totally impractical if not im-
possible open court testimony with cross-examination. Such a procedure
could endlessly delay criminal administration in a retrial of collateral is-
sues.... The due process clause should not be treated as a device for freezing
the evidential procedure of sentencing into the mold of trial procedure. So
to treat the due process clause would hinder if not preclude all courts - state
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The policy conflict involved is, on the one hand, the desire to
have the sentencing court supplied with the fullest possible infor-
mation about the offender although the degree of credibility is un-
known and, on the other, the desire to protect -the offender against
any possible prejudice from false data even though such protection
might result in the exclusion of other important and accurate in-
formation.
In order -to cope with this conflict, the Court distinguished be-
tween a trial, which is governed by the ordinary evidentiary rules of
an adversary proceeding, and a pre-sentencing hearing, which is in
the nature of a nonadversary proceeding." The logical reason for
this distinction is that after the defendant has been found guilty,
the judge must concern himself primarily with individualizing the
punishment so that it fits the offender as well as the crime.9 The
judge is no longer concerned with the narrow issue of guilt which,
of course, must be decided according to the strict rules of evidence.
Instead, a more flexible standard is applied so that he might decide
what is the best correctional treatment for the defendant."2
If this proposition, namely, that a pre-sentencing hearing is non-
adversary in nature, is true,"3 then it should be quite obvious that
the rule of Williams v. New York9 can be applied by analogy to
the facts in a child custody proceeding. In support of this it should
be emphasized that in both a pre-sentencing hearing and a child
custody proceeding, the background of the persons involved, as re-
vealed by the reports under discussion, are essential for a correct
determination. Both are very much concerned with individualized
treatment because of the unique facts that exist in each case. More-
over, the nonadversary nature of both types of proceedings reduces
and federal - from making progressive efforts to improve the administra-
tion of criminal justice. Id. at 250-51.
90 Id. at 246-49.
9 1 Prevalent modern philosophy also supports the view that the punishment should
fit the offender and not merely the crime. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51,
55 (1937); People v. Johnson, 252 N.Y. 387, 392, 169 N.E. 619, 621 (1930).
9 2 In the federal system, the probation service of the court makes an investigation
and then reports to the judge on the defendant. See FED. R. CRM. P. 32.
93 See also, Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1958) (state's attorney explained
details of the crime and petitioner's criminal record); United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S.
1 (1952) (litigious interruption can be crucial because of nature of the hearing); United
States v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966) (suggestion that there are two stand-
ards of due process in criminal and civil proceedings); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963), (parole revocation proceedings not ad-
versary hearing requiring constitational due process); Ward v. California, 269 F.2d 906
(9th Cir. 1959) (report made available to sentencing jury but not judge).
94 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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the importance of an opportunity to cross-examine and rebut the
information contained in the report, the lack of which might other-
wise result in a timely and costly retrial of collateral issues. Be-
cause a custody proceeding is nonadversary, the court's use of out-
side reports in such proceedings should not be considered a depriva-
tion of due process because of the analogy to the rules pertaining
to a pre-sentencing hearing. 5
B. Similarity to Nonadversary Juvenile Court Proceedings
An additional analogy in support of the proposal that custody
proceedings are nonadversary in their use of outside investigation
reports is the similar underlying reasoning of juvenile court pro-
ceedings.
Over the years, court decisions had repeatedly stated that a ju-
venile court proceeding is not criminal in nature.96 Its philosophy
was not to punish the child but to take him out of an environment
which would be detrimental to both the child and society.9" The
juvenile court therefore functioned on a socio-legal basis, recog-
nizing the fact that the law, without assistance, was incompetent to
decide what is the best treatment for delinquent and criminal indi-
viduals.9" However, the recent United States Supreme Court case of
In re Gault, affording the juvenile, among other protections, his full
constitutional rights to counsel and confrontation, as well as the
privilege against self-incrimination, has thrown this area into a
state of uncertainty as to precisely what type of proceeding juvenile
hearings are regarding the adjudication of an alleged delinquent.
The main concern here is related to the use of hearsay in a ju-
venile court proceeding in the form of investigation reports. As to
the use of hearsay during the adjdicatory stage, juvenile courts gen-
erally hold that hearsay evidence is inadmissible because there is no
opportunity to cross-examine.99
95 One could attempt to argue that such an analogy cannot be made because one
proceeding is civil and the other is criminal, thereby requiring two different degrees
of proof. However, the validity of this argument is weakened by the mere fact that in
the leading case of Williams v. Williams, 8 IM. App. 2d 1, 130 N.E.2d 291 (1955) the
court, in a custody proceeding, relied very heavily on two criminal law cases. For a
discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
9 6 See, e.g., In re McDonald, 153 A.2d 651 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1959); In re
Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955); In re
Gonzalez, 328 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Canta v. State, 207 S.W.2d 901
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
0 T See 33 O-to JUR. 2D Juvenile Courts §§ 5-6 (1958).
08 Lou, JUVENILE CouRTs IN THE UNITE STATES 2 (1927).
09 E.g., State v. Shardell, supra note 101, at 342, 153 N.E.2d at 513.
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In spite of the Gault case and the general disapproval of outside
reports during adjudication,10 it is suggested that hearsay may prop-
erly be resorted to during the more critical stage of disposition, at
which time it is common for the judge to consider probation reports,
psychological and psychiatric data, and other information germane
to a proper disposition.' Therefore, in regard to the dispositional
stage of a juvenile court proceeding, the judge should not be limited
by the rules of evidence because the prior adjudication has estab-
lished his jurisdiction to impose, at his discretion, the necessary treat-
ment. In essence, he is seeking external aid in making his decision
of what is the best disposition for this particular child.0 2
This procedure is certainly analogous to that presented in a
child custody proceeding because both are nonadversary by their
very nature. Similarly, both are concerned with the background
information in the case as revealed by the outside investigation so
that the causes of the existing problems and their future conse-
quences can be accurately considered in order to better determine
where to place the child. More important, it should be apparent
that both proceedings are concerned primarily with what is in the
best interests of the child.
V. USE OF SUMMARY REPORTS AS A REMEDY
TO OBJECTIONS
Briefly, it can be said without question that there are three sit-
uations in which outside investigations can be used without infring-
ing upon due process requirements: (1) admission of reports into
evidence provided full disclosure is made;05 (2) consent of the par-
ties in certain jurisdictions;0 4 and (3) consideration of outside re-
ports when there is sufficient legal evidence supporting the same
findings.' °
Through the use of summary reports, in which the judge relates
in a very general way in open court for both the record and the
100 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, PROCEDURE AND EVI-
DENCE IN THE JUVENILE COURT 58 (1962).
101 ibid.
102 Id. at 58-59.
103 Williams v. Williams, 8 Ii. App. 2d 1, 130 N.E.2d 291 (1955) is the leading
case which by implication represents this proposition.
104 For a discussion of this situation, see text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
105 This opinion can be justified on the theory that judges disregard such incompe-
tent evidence; but this, of course, is a mere presumption. Cline v. May, 287 S.W.2d




parties what the outside report contained, the court is able to make
full use of the report without any deprivation of due process of law.
Such partial disclosure tends to overcome the "secret evidence" ob-
jection. Stated differently, it is, in essence, a compromise between
the rule against "secret evidence" and the necessity of protecting an
informant's identity.0 6
When the contents of an outside investigation are partially dis-
dosed through their introduction as evidence in court, two hearsay
problems definitely arise. First, the report itself may be inadmissi-
ble as hearsay when the social worker is not in court to testify sub-
ject to the rules of evidence.'07 Second, even if the social worker
is in court, the report is still an out-of-court statement offered for
the truth of the matter asserted.' 8 In order to overcome these
problems, the report could be admitted into evidence under one of
the following exceptions to the hearsay rule: (1) business records;. 9
(2) official written statements;" 0. (3) past recollection recorded if
the investigator testifies;"'. or (4) the possibility of a new excep-
tion being established for summary reports."
It is apparent at this point that there are cogent reasons support-
ing the confidentiality of outside investigations, at least in child cus-
tody proceedings which are actually of a nonadversary nature." 3
In addition, the informants would not cooperate if they knew that
the parties might learn of their identity; as a consequence, strained
relations might develop among the informants, investigators, and
parties.
Furthermore, collateral issues to be tried would arise as to the
truth or falsity of certain facts, meaning that custody proceedings
would be more time consuming and would eventually lead to a fur-
106 Cf. Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 722 (9th Cir. 1955).
'
0 7 Dier v. Dier, 141 Neb. 685, 4 N.W.2d 731 (1942).
108 Grand Forks Bldg. & Dev. Co. v. Implement Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 75 N.
Dak. 618, 31 N.W.2d 495 (1948).
109 cCoRpCK, EvIDENcE § 280 (1954).
11oId. § 278.
I" The reason is that the investigator will probably have forgotten the contents of
the report. For a discussion of these and other exceptions to the hearsay rule, see gen-
erally id. §§ 276-99.
112 One possibility is allowing a privilege as to the identity of the informants.
However, the validity of this is doubtful in that such an "infomer's" privilege has
been denied in cases of a more threatening nature to society, namely, criminal and se-
carity cases. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d
708 (9th Cir. 1955).
113 For a discussion of the classification of such proceedings, see text accompany-
ing notes 20-22 supra.
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ther dogging of the trial docket. As a result, it is possible that
judges would dispense with such reports completely in order to
avoid the necessity of trying disputed collateral issues of fact, thereby
subverting the whole principle of seeking "what is in the best in-
terests of the child." '114 Moreover, when summary reports are used,
they become part of the trial record of use on appeal. Consequently,
it is suggested that the use of summary reports in child custody pro-
ceedings will satisfy the normal requirements of due process of law.
VI. CONCLUSION
A study of legislation in this area indicates that present statutory
provisions fail to meet the requirements of due process as regards,
for example, the failure to provide an adequate opportunity for
cross-examination. An explanation for the deficiency is that many
of these statutes were enacted prior to the recent interest in due pro-
cess problems and the current advancements in behavioral science.
Because child custody proceedings are nonadversary, the courts
must be willing to recognize that certain requirements of due pro-
cess should not restrict the use of outside investigations by compe-
tent investigators. This can be accomplished by a revision of the
state statutes to stress the necessity for investigatory reports. The
judges will then have more information on which to make an ac-
curate determination of what is in the best interests of the child.
In order to achieve revision, legal authorities have encouraged
greater cooperation between the courts and the behavioral sciences.
It is necessary, though, that the social worker become better edu-
cated as to the nature and function of the judicial process so as to
make his report more consistent with the traditional notions of jus-
tice. The courts in turn must recognize the increased competence
of the social sciences and the potential contributions of investigatory
reports in child custody cases.
LLOYD D. MAZUR
CHARLES P. ROSE, JR.
-14 It should be noted here that this is based upon the assumption that hearings at
this stage would be frequent and time consuming. It seems probable, however, that if
such reports are true, there will be no disputed facts or they will at least be kept pro-
portionately small in number.
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